Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation by Popov, Sergey V.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Decentralized Bribery and Market
Participation
Sergey V. Popov
National Research University Higher School of Economics
26. September 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43829/
MPRA Paper No. 43829, posted 16. January 2013 14:41 UTC
Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation∗
Sergey V. Popov
January 16, 2013
Abstract
I propose a bribery model with decentralized bureaucratic decisionmaking. There are
multiple stable equilibria: high levels of bribery reduce the economy’s productivity
due to suppression of small businesses, and reduces the total graft even though it
might increase the individual bribe amount. The coordinated deviation to a better
participation equilibrium is impossible due to decentralization. Anti-corruption efforts,
even temporary, might be useful if they invite better participation.
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JEL: D73.
The Russian language distinguishes between two different classes of bribery: likhoimstvo
is bribery for actions that an official should be preventing; and mzdoimstvo is bribery for
actions that an official should be doing for free. Both are corruption, using public office for
personal gain. The first kind of bribery sometimes can be prosecuted ex-post, and it’s clearly
detrimental to the welfare of the economy. The second kind of bribery is simply a transfer,
and is therefore perceived as innocuous. I concentrate on the second kind of bribery in this
study, and I show that this “transfer bribery”1 has significant economic consequences.
∗Popov: National Research University Higher School of Economics, Pokrovskiy blvd, 11, Moscow, 109028,
Russia. svp@hse.ru. I thank Dan Bernhardt, Mattias Polborn, John Nye and the participants of a seminar
in the Laboratory of Institutional Analysis at HSE for useful suggestions and thought-provoking discussions.
The support of the Basic Research Program at HSE is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
1Shleifer and Vishny (1993) calls this corruption without theft, Bliss and Di Tella (1997) calls this surplus-
shifting corruption, and Drugov (2010) calls this extortion.
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Empirical literature measures the extent of corruption by conducting surveys among
entrepreneurs and asking how frequently one had to pay a bribe, or how big was the last
bribe the surveyed person paid. But when the expected bribe is too high, corruption deters
entry, and all “invisible investors” who could have entered, but did not, do not have a chance
to answer such a survey. I argue that while eradicating corruption might not be plausible,
fighting corruption to lower bribes and make entry easier might be sufficiently rewarding.
To illustrate my point, I propose a model of bribery that does not require the influence
of centralized government (for examples of business-to-business corruption, see The Inde-
pendent (1995); The Register (2012); The St. Petersburg Times (2012)). Most people face
corruption everywhere: it is never the case, for example, that the police are corrupt, but
educators are not. Moreover, a corrupt policeman will eventually interact as a client with a
possibly corrupt educator, who in turn will be a client of a potentially corrupt doctor. Most
of the time, corrupt officials would rather pay smaller bribes themselves. But individual
changes in bribe-taking behavior will not change the bribe amount that bribe-givers expect
to give, and this critical issue is not captured by a single-bureaucrat approach.
Because bribes are illegal, they have to be charged before the returns can be harvested
(so that there is no problem of shirking away from the paying of the bribe), but after
the investment decision has been made (so that potential bribe-payers identify themselves).
When the expected bribe is too large, investors with smaller projects would not start up
their projects. Inspectors would expect larger projects to start up, and react by further
increase of the expected bribe. Decentralization of decisionmaking makes the cooperation
of inspectors harder, keeping the economy below the production possibility frontier. Hence,
I argue, the potential difference in corruption between seemingly similar countries might be
in the equilibirum participation patterns, and not in something fundamental (see Del Monte
and Papagni (2007) on differences in corruption across regions of Italy).
The literature has reached an empirical consensus that corruption is detrimental to wel-
fare, and significantly reduces both long-term growth and near-term investment. Govern-
ments spend more on capital investment (and choose less efficient projects), but less on
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maintenance, healthcare and education. Corrupt economies are mostly closed and heav-
ily regulated. Corruption is enforced by a lack of education, low income levels and ethnic
heterogeneity, weak institutions, and lack of trust in the society2.
There is a vast theoretical literature on corruption. It includes the queue model of Lui
(1985), where bribes are taken for advancing customers in a queue and actually improve
allocations; Alesina and Angeletos (2005) models theft from government coffers, arguing
that more redistribution does not necessarily bring more equality because of corruption; ?
builds a model of endogenous regulation, arguing that societies with little social conscience
invite more regulation; and many others.
The closest model to mine is Bliss and Di Tella (1997). They argue that corruption can
make the economy less competitive, move to a monopoly outcome and that bureaucrats can
siphon all the monopoly profits away. Svensson (2003) uses a similar model to accompany
a survey from Uganda to illustrate that the size of bribe depends on a firm’s prospects. He
predicts that because of bribes, investment in a less profitable sector with more liquid assets
might be preferred to investment in a more profitable sector that features less investment
reversibility precisely because officials require bigger bribes in the second scenario. Mauro
(2004) incorporates corruption into a growth model, bringing attention to multiple equilibria
as a potential cause of differences in development trajectories. In contrast to my model, his
model focuses on governmental provision of a public good.
The rent seeking literature, pioneered by Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974), argues that
transfers are not necessarily harmless to society since the very existence and maintenance of
these transfers is usually an outcome of the political struggle between transfer-payers and
transfer-receivers (Tullock, 1971). Moreover, corrupt bureaucrats have to pay homage to
supervising bureaucrats and to combat peer bureaucrats in turf wars, increasing the wel-
fare costs of corruption transfers (Hillman and Katz, 1987; Kahana and Qijun, 2010). The
wastefulness of the transfer technology, coming either from diverting resources from produc-
tive ends to redistribution by investors or from misallocation of resources by bureaucrats, is
2See Mauro (1995, 1997); Tanzi and Davoodi (1997); Ades and Di Tella (1999); La Porta et al. (1999);
Djankov et al. (2002); Fan et al. (2009).
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complementary to my argument, which does not rely on any competition, innate or induced.
This paper is organized as follows. First, I introduce the general model and define the
equilibrium. I then look at the model’s predictions: I show how to combat corruption
with exit facilitation; I illustrate that transfer bribery might keep the economy in a bad
equilibrium where small entrepreneurs do not start up their businesses.Finally, I discuss my
model’s limitations and potential extensions, and conclude.
1 The Model
Think of a person who comes to a driver license issuing facility to pass a driving test. The
inspector can clearly see a bad driver, and perfectly understands the welfare costs of allowing
bad drivers on the street. Denying a driver’s license to a good driver does not produce a
welfare externality, ignoring congestion. The inspector can deny a license to a qualified
applicant, and there are ways to do so safely: missing a look in a rear-view mirror can be
inflated into “reckless driving”. Would coercing a bribe in this situation make a difference?
Agents interact in a single-period game3. There is a continuum measure 1 of ex-ante
identical risk-neutral agents, whose preferences are defined over a single good, which can be
consumed or invested. There are two possibly overlapping subsets of agents: investors and
inspectors, both of positive mass. Role assignment is random.
Time
Roles are assigned
randomly
Investors observe
realizations of their K
Each investor decides
whether to start up
his project
Each inspector
extorts a bribe s
R observed; investors
decide whether to bribe
inspectors or quit
Payoffs resolve
Figure 1: Timing of the game
Investors draw a project of size K, where K is the required number of units that must be
3I postpone the discussion of model variations to the conclusion.
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invested. This can take two values, KL and KH , with probabilities λ and 1− λ.4 A project
returns a random, idiosyncratic payoff R ≥ 0 per unit of investment, drawn from pdf fR(·)
and cdf FR(·), independent of K.
After investment, each investor is assigned a random inspector, who is supposed to ap-
prove the project, but instead attempts to extort a bribe, a sum of money s, from the project’s
profits. If the realized project’s profits after paying the bribe are too small, the project can
be cancelled, and the investor recovers fraction φ of his investment.
Each investor must decide whether to pursue his investment project. Starting a project
of size K earns the expectation of5
ER[(RK − s) ∨ φK]−K = (ER[(R− s/K) ∨ φ]− 1)K.
If the after-bribe net return is less than φ, investor cancels the project. The investor cannot
be liable for the project that is not lucrative enough to pay for the bribe that it faces. In
other words, an investor cannot be forced to pay a bribe; the investor can instead choose to
take everything he can and walk away.
An investor starts his project if his expected net return is positive, i.e., if
ER[(R− s/K) ∨ φ]− 1 ≥ 0. (1)
Result 1 If the participation constraint (1) is satisfied for some value of K (φ), it is satisfied
for the same bribe size for projects with larger K (φ) too.
The characterization of participation decision is straightforward if there is no uncertainty
about the bribe size. Let sˆ denote the value of s such that (1) holds with equality (implicitly
indexed by K). It is profitable for an investor to start a project of size K if and only if s < sˆ.
4The heterogeneity of K could be motivated not only by technology, but also by the pledgeable income
of investors.
5Here a ∨ b is an operator of max(a, b).
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If returns are drawn from an exponential distribution, the borderline sˆ is governed by
E[R− sˆ
K
∨ φ] = φ+ e−α( sˆK+φ)
(
1
α
)
= 1⇒ sˆ =
(− lnα(1− φ)
α
− φ
)
K.
An inspector observes neither K nor R, so his bribe demand cannot depend on either.
In equilibrium, each inspector knows projects of which sizes are started up by investors, and
this will form his beliefs EK [·] about the possible size of the project at his mercy. Since
inspectors are risk-neutral, the amount of projects per inspector does not affect the decision
for each individual project. An inspector’s problem is to choose bribe demand s to solve
max
s
sP (RK − s > φ) = sEK [(1− FR(s/K + φ))] . (2)
The first-order condition6 is
EK [(1− FR(s∗/K + φ))] = s∗EK [1/KfR(s∗/K + φ)] ,
s∗ =
EK [(1− FR(s∗/K + φ))]
EK [1/KfR(s
∗/K + φ)]
. (3)
An equilibrium (pure strategy perfect Bayesian) is a collection of
• s∗ ∈ R+: the size of bribe, amount of money taken out of the project’s profits if the
bribe gets paid;
• K∗ ∈ R+: the critical level of investment such that investors with projects of size
K ≥ K∗ decide to pursue them;
such that
• s∗ solves the inspector’s problem (2), given rational beliefs that only projects above
K∗ are implemented (EK [·] = E[·|K ≥ K∗]), and
6When there is no uncertainty about K, signals do not matter, and Equation (3) can be rewritten as
s
K =
1−FR(s/K+φ)
fR(s/K+φ)
. Assuming the right-hand side to be decreasing (the increasing hazard rate assumption is
satisfied by a large family of distributions) will guarantee the inspector’s problem to have a unique solution.
However, in Subsection 1.2 I’ll give an example of distributions of K and R that produce an increasing
right-hand side of Equation (3) even though the distribution of R has a nondecreasing hazard rate.
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• an investor with a project of size K∗ is weakly better off starting the project, and
all owners of projects with K < K∗ find it suboptimal to pursue the project, given
rational beliefs about the bribe size s∗.
This equilibrium is perfect Bayesian because inspectors’s beliefs about the distribution
of projects’ sizes depends upon the equilibrium decisions of investors.
Result 2 An equilibrium exists.
There are three classes of outcomes, depending on the investors’ participation, where no
investors are indifferent between participation and abstaining7:
• full participation: both KH and KL type projects start up;
• partial participation: only KH projects started up;
• no participation: no projects are started up.8
The “full participation” and the “no participation” equilibria are pooling, whereas the
partial participation equilibrium is separating.
Result 3 When FR(·) features nondecreasing hazard rate9, the equilibrium bribe in full par-
ticipation equilibrium is smaller than the equilibrium bribe level in partial participation equi-
librium.
This result is somewhat generalizable: under assumptions on the behavior of EK [1−FR(s/K)]
EK [fR(s/K)]
not necessarily implied by the increasing hazard rate of FR(·), one can show that in equilibria
with better participation of smaller-size projects inspectors lower bribes.
Next, I study the properties of equilibria. The model is compact, yet it allows me to
convey the main result: corruption can be so rampant that small projects are not viable,
7The equilibria where investors with K = K∗ are indifferent between participating and not, and they
therefore split nontrivially between participating and abstaining, can be shown to be unstable.
8If a partial equilibrium exists, then an argument similar to the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps
(1987) refines away the no participation equilibrium: the bribe cannot be expected to be so big that the best
possible project is not executed, because what type of projects would support these bribes?
9Technically, “nondecreasing hazard rate” can be relaxed to “x− 1−FR(x)fR(x) is increasing”.
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and only big projects can start up. This only increases the bribe size, securing the separation
between equilibria. Hence, even decentralized transfer bribery can harm the economy, and
the harm is not limited to the less lucrative projects being cancelled due to a too small
outcome of R.
1.1 Recovery Rate Affects Bribery
The rate of recovery, defining when an investor decides that the bribe demand is too high
and decides not to pursue the project, has a strong effect on corruption. Consider a function
H(x|φ) = EK [1−FR(x/K+φ)]
EK [1/KfR(x/K+φ)]
, a reformulation of (3). The bribe size demanded by inspectors
will be the intersection of the 45◦ line with H(x|φ).
Result 4 Suppose there is no uncertainty about the project size K. Then an increase in φ
reduces the bribe level s = H(s|φ) as long as FR(·) has an increasing hazard rate.
If returns are exponentially distributed, with no uncertainty about investment size, the
recovery rate has no effect on the equilibrium bribe demand.10 However, most distributions
feature an increasing hazard rate, and the result is very intuitive: a better recovery rate
makes it more attractive for the investor to cancel a project, which causes inspectors to
reduce their demands.
s
s,H(s|φ)
45◦ line
H(s|φ = 0)
H(s|φ = 0.2)
Bribe at φ = 0
Bribe at φ = 0.2
Note: fR(·) is 2× Beta(0.1, 0.3), KH = 1, KL = 0.5, K = KL with probability λ = 0.5.
Figure 2: Increase in recovery rate lowers the bribe.
10One can see that in Subsection 1.2, with the uncertainty about the project size distribution, the recovery
rate change does not matter. The right-hand side of Equation (4) is exactly zero.
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Result 5 If EK [1/Kf
′
R(s
∗/K+φ)] is not too negative for λ ∈ {λH , λL}, increase in φ reduces
the bribe level s∗.
These are sufficient conditions for
∂H(x|φ)
∂φ
=
(
− EK [fR(
x/K + φ)]
EK [1/KfR(x/K + φ)]
−H(x|φ)E[
1/Kf ′R(x/K + φ)]
E[1/KfR(x/K + φ)]
)
< 0 (4)
to hold at x = s∗. Figure 2 illustrates the logic11. A cleaner but significantly stricter
assumption that f ′R(·) is positive on the whole support of R is clearly violated by any
distribution of R with unbounded support.
Better recovery rates can reduce bribes because inspectors realize that investors have
a better outside opportunity, and will tolerate bribes less. This can motivate bribe-takers
to demand industry-specific investments from potential investors before they can apply for
a permit. This also suggests that industries with better recovery rates should suffer less
from corruption, especially when one endogenizes decisions by corrupt officials to choose the
industry to target. For example, software development, which is easy to set up and sell out,
is likely to be less rife with corruption than highway construction, which features signifi-
cant investment into industry-specific equipment. This seems to be a strong and intuitive
recipe for corruption fighting: make investment more recoverable, possibly by stimulating
industries with easier recoverability. This does not mean that government should subsidize
cancellations, because then less lucrative projects may start up just to get canceled.
To ease presentation, φ will be set to 0 for the rest of the paper.
1.2 Decentralized Corruption Deters Entry
For this part, I will use an environment that features heterogeneity with respect to project
size and exponential returns: R ∼ Exp(α), so that P (R > t) = e−αt. As seen from Result 3
11When intersections with the diagonal are “from above”, with s < H(s|φ) for s locally on the left from
intersection (and vice versa from the right), like on Figure 2, these are local maxima. Intersections “from
below”, when s > H(s|φ) locally on the left of intersection, are local minima.
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and will be seen from the presentation, this specific assumption about the distribution of R
is easily generalizable.
If both types of projects are getting started up, the utility of the inspector as a function
of the bribe amount s is
sP (RK > s) = s
(
λe
−α s
KL + (1− λ)e−α sKH
)
. (5)
To solve for the equilibrium, consider the best response of inspectors. The first-order
condition of the inspector’s problem (5) is
s =
1
α
λe
−α s
KL + (1− λ)e−α sKH
λ
KL
e
−α s
KL + 1−λ
KH
e
−α s
KH
=
KL
α
1 +
(
1− KL
KH
)
e
αs
(
1
KL
− 1
KH
)
λ
1−λ +
KL
KH
e
αs
(
1
KL
− 1
KH
)
 . (6)
The right-hand side is an increasing function12 of s, starting from a value above KL
α
and
converging to KH
α
. Therefore, (6) has a solution.
When only projects of size KH are started up, the inspector’s first-order condition’s
right-hand side changes:
s =
1
α
0× e−α sKL + 1× e−α sKH
0
KL
e
−α s
KL + 1
KH
e
−α s
KH
=
KH
α
. (7)
There might be multiple equilibria under reasonable assumptions. Figure 3a shows an
example of such an outcome. The bribe s∗1 is a partial participation equilibrium bribe: when
inspectors demand this bribe, only projects of size KH start up. Inspectors, expecting only
projects of type KH , pick their bribe size extortion decision according to (7), and choose
s∗1 as their bribe choice. The bribe of size s
∗
2 is the full participation equilibirum bribe:
both types of projects find it optimal to start up, since even smallest projects will start up
(s∗2 < sˆ). Inspectors, expecting both types of projects to start up, choose the extorted bribe
12This is increasing because the likelihood of a continuing project to be of KH type is increasing with the
bribe size. Increasing hazard rate assumption on fR(·) is no longer sufficient for the uniqueness of a solution
to (6).
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size using Equation (6), and choose s2.
s
s,H(s)
45◦ line
sˆ
Equation (7)KH
α
Equation (6)
s∗2
KL
α
s∗1
Full
participation
bribe
Partial participation bribe
Unstable equilibrium
(a) Non-informed inspectors
s
s,H(s)
45◦ line
KL
α
KH
α
Equation (7)
(6) with λL
(6) with λH
s∗L s
∗
H
Full
participation
bribes
Partial participation bribe
(b) Informed inspectors
Note: α = 0.2, KL = 1, KH = 2, λ = 0.6. Since KL = 1, sˆ is the bribe that agents with type L projects can pay and be indifferent
between starting up the project or not; see Equation (1). For KH projects, 2sˆ > KH/α, so partial participation equilibrium exists. For
Figure 3a, the solid line connects the relevant parts of Equations (6) and (7) to reveal the best response of the investors. For Figure
3b, the expected return of the low-type project allows for the existence of full participation equilibrium. λH and λL are defined below,
in Equation (8).
Figure 3: Multiple equilibria
Both equilibria are stable: a tiny change in the fundamentals of both investors’ and
inspectors’ problems do not make either equilibrium go away. The full participation equilib-
rium needs either large enough λ or E[R] = 1
α
to exist: sˆ(K) increases in 1/α slower than the
right-hand side of (6). Lower KH
KL
too lowers the bribe size without affecting the participation
constraint for KL types.
The welfare costs of bribery are not as much in the loss of less lucrative projects (the ones
that get cancelled), but in squandering small projects in the partial participation equilibirum.
Even though a temporary effort in lowering bribes cannot remove bribes completely, it can
be strong enough to move the economy into an equilibrium where more projects are started
up. Both inspectors and investors are interested in this outcome—large project investors
start paying smaller bribes, small project investors now find bribes small enough to start
their small projects, and inspectors collect bigger graft. Indeed, were inspectors able to
communicate and make centralized decisions, they could facilitate movement into a better
equilibrium, for instance by announcing ex-ante that they are going to charge a smaller bribe.
If inspectors could coo¨rdinate on such centralized deviation, they would do so.
If inspectors had perfect information about every project’s size, this shortcoming would
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not be an issue, as inspectors could charge bribes proportional to the size of the project.13
Even imperfect information would ease the participation constraint on the small projects’
investors, potentially inviting them to participate. This would not, however, destroy the
partial participation equilibirum.
Assume that the inspector obtains a correct signal with probability q > 1
2
. The inspector
would update an apriori belief in probability of observing a low-type project conditional on
the signal:
λH =
(1− q)λ
q(1− λ) + (1− q)λ, λL =
qλ
qλ+ (1− q)(1− λ) . (8)
Since q > 1/2, λL < λ < λH . Based on the signal, each inspector will choose the bribe size.
These problems are illustrated in Figure 3b: s∗L is the bribe chosen when inspector observes
L, and s∗H is chosen when H is observed.
Result 6 If partial participation equilibrium exists, for large enough q the full participation
equilibrium exists.
This does not remove the existence of the partial participation equilibrium. Even if q is big
enough, so that the full participation equilibrium exists, a belief that small businesses do
not start up will lead inspectors to rationally disregard their signals. Investors with small
projects will stay away, supporting the belief of inspectors. Even if investors could coo¨perate
and start up a positive mass of small projects to manifest their collective potential, the
decentralization of decisionmaking would neither allow individual inspectors to comprehend
the organized deviation nor to attempt lowering the bribe to attract small businesses. Unless
q = 1, the problem of squandering small projects persists.
2 Discussion
Competition among investors is assumed away to illustrate that the multiplicity of equilibria
is not driven by strategic complementartities or rent seeking. One could assume that the
13The inspector can convey his bribe expectations by citing the “violated” statute codes: a corrupt traffic
officer could threaten a driver with Kentucky plates with a speeding ticket, and a driver with Rhode Island
plates with reckless driving.
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returns’ distribution is stochastically improving if there are fewer projects starting up. This
could obtain two equilibria, one with high profits and high bribes, and one with low profits
and low bribes, depending upon the functional form of stochastic improvement. On the
other hand, more competition induces more innovation, and hence in the long run the total
graft might be higher in a more competitive allocation. This ambiguity is hard to resolve in
general scenario, but empirical evidence does suggest that a lack of competition is part in
parcel with corruption (see Ades and Di Tella (1999)).
Risk aversion is not modeled explicitly, but the results are robust. Risk-averse investors
will have a stronger participation constraint, but will not change investors’ behavior after
investment, since I assume no uncertainty about R at the point of decision to pay the
bribe. Hence, the bribe amount will not be affected unless the set of participating projects
is affected. The risk aversion of inspectors, on the other hand, will somewhat change the
inspector’s problem. Particularly, if the Bernoulli utility of s dollars of bribe is u(s) =
(s+ µ)ρ − µρ, where ρ ∈ (0, 1) and µ > 0, the inspector’s choice equation becomes
s = ρ
EK [1− FR(s/K)]
EK [1/KfR(s/K)]
+
increases in s︷ ︸︸ ︷
µ
((
1 +
s
µ
)1−ρ
− 1
)
.
When µ is zero, only the first term remains. The second part of right-hand side increases
slower than left-hand side for big enough s, so the optimal solution exists if the solution
existed originally. Solution is continuous in µ and ρ. If, in addition, u′(0) = ρµρ−1 ≤ 1, this
can be interpreted as a wasteful bribe-pocketing technology, where the transfer of s produces
(s + µ)ρ − µρ ≤ s of cash in inspector’s pocket. Other forms of utility functions are also
possible. But even the simplest risk aversion in inspectors make the bribe size dependent
upon the bribe opportunities. A larger number of projects per inspector might enable the
inspector to risk more, and charge bigger bribes.
Honest inspectors that do not ask for bribes will relax the participation constraint, cre-
ating a more hospitable atmosphere for small businesses, but simultaneously they will let
big fish go away non-squeezed. The body of corrupt officials might actually be interested in
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cleansing the ranks to induce better participation of investors, depending upon the shapes
of distributions of R and K, but not necessarily to the socially optimal levels.
Income equality and growth are the usual criteria of effective governance. If small busi-
nesses are suppressed, and the heterogeneity with respect to K is induced by limited pledge-
able income of the poor, this is likely to create a version of the poverty trap, where poor
entrepreneurs can never earn enough to start up a business large enough to feed the cor-
rupt, whereas rich dynasties run large-scale enterprises even though they might suffer from
decreasing returns to scale. Growth is not modeled explicitly for brevity. As Alesina and
Angeletos (2005) emphasize, it is important to recognize that the problem of bad equilibrium
with high corruption being stable is not that there is just a sequence of beliefs that lead to a
bad equilibrium. The bad stable equilibrium is corresponding to a long historical experience
of high corruption that suffocates small-scale businesses. Short-term losses are multiplied by
long-term iterations, generating cross-country growth divergence.
A general equilibrium model—featuring the choice of the role, the decision of each in-
vestor to run a “good” project or a “bad” project (with unfavorable properties like negative
externalities), the decision of the informed inspector to prevent bad projects or ask for a
bribe, and decisions of a policymaker regarding the inspectors’ renumeration package, taxa-
tion and supervision over the inspectors—would be richer, and would provide a better view
of ways in which corruption hurts the society. One could contemplate the wage effects:
higher wage outside investor-inspector communications would actually lower the coerced
bribe amount, because the projects would become relatively less profitable. One could also
see that squandering of small projects would lead to lower demand for labor, and therefore
lower wages, having an indirect effect on ex-post inequality. However, this will obscure the
main interaction I want to study: between “good” project starters and corrupt inspectors.
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3 Conclusion
In this study, I find that transfer bribery is not economically neutral. Too high bribes might
not only kill the less lucrative projects, but also can discourage small businesses from opening
up, since bureaucrats cannot distinguish the investment size from the investment’s return.
Joint deviation into a better equilibrium where small projects start up is not feasible due to
decentralization. A large enough crackdown on corruption, even temporary, can invite better
participation by lowering the bribes temporarily, which will change the beliefs of inspectors
and lower the bribes in the long run. Granted, it increases both the amount of bribes
collected and the amount of those who pay bribes, both common measures of corruption size
in the economy, but it makes all agents better off.
A Proofs of Results
Result 1: Fix the level of bribe s. Let K ′ > K, and let for K hold E[R − s
K
∨ φ] ≥ 1.
Observe that s
K′ <
s
K
, and therefore R− s
K′ > R− sK for every R. Therefore, [
(
R− s
K′
)∨φ] ≥
[
(
R− s
K
) ∨ φ]. Take expectations to obtain the result.
Let φ′ > φ. Observe that [
(
R− s
K
)∨φ] < [[(R− s
K
)∨φ]∨φ′] < [(R− s
K
)∨φ′] for every
R. Take expectations to obtain the result.
Result 2: Equilibrium with no participation always exists. The existence of both full
and partial participation equilibria can be verified by solving (3).
Result 3: For the purpose of clarity, φ = 0; nothing changes if φ is positive. If only
KL (KH) types of projects were present in the economy, which would correspond to λ = 1
(λ = 0), nondecreasing hazard rate property of FR(·) drives the bribe levels in such economies
to be
sL/KL =
1− FR(sL/KL)
fR(sL/KL)
, sH/KH =
1− FR(sH/KH)
fR(sH/KH)
.
Therefore, sL/KL = sH/KH , which, particularly, means that sH > sL. Also, nondecreasing
hazard rate property guarantees that s/KL <
1−FR(s/KL)
fR(s/KL)
when s < sL, and opposite is true
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if s > sL. Similar statements hold for sH . Therefore,
sfR(s/KL)/KL > 1− FR(s/KL), s > sL
sfR(s/KH)/KH > 1− FR(s/KH), s > sH .
Opposite statements hold for cases when s < sL ans s < sH . Now let us return back to the
full participation equilibrium. For every λ ∈ (0, 1), no bribe level above sH can be a solution
of the inspector’s problem:
s
EK [fR(s/K)/K]︷ ︸︸ ︷
λfR(s/KL)/KL + (1− λ)fR(s/KH)/KH >
EK [1−FR(s/K)]︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ (1− FR(s/KL)) + (1− λ) (1− FR(s/KH))
⇒ s > EK [1− FR(s/K)]
EK [fR(s/K)]
when s > max(sL, sK) = sH .
Equivalently, one can show that no bribe level below sL can be a solution in the full partic-
ipation model. Unless λ is equal to 0 (or 1), equilibrium bribe level cannot also be equal to
sH (or sL). Therefore, the equilibrium bribe level is less than sH .
Result 4: When there is no uncertainty, HR(s|φ) = 1−FR(s+φ)fR(s+φ) . When R distribution
features an increasing hazard rate, HR(·) is decreasing. An increase in φ means a shift of
HR(·) to the left; hence, the intersection is happening at a smaller value of s.
Result 5: Both conditions are sufficient for (4) to hold.
Result 6: When the partial participation equilibrium exists, it means that for H-type
projects, s∗H =
1−FR(s∗H/KH)
fR(s
∗
H/KH)
KH satisfies the participation constraint, or that E[R−s∗H/KH∨0] >
1. When q = 1, s∗L =
1−FR(s∗L/KL)
fR(s
∗
L/KL)
KL, and therefore s
∗
H/KH = s
∗
L/KL, since the solution to
t = 1−FR(t)
fR(t)
is unique by assumption. Because of this, E[R − s∗L/KL ∨ 0] > 1, and therefore
participation constraint is satisfied. Finally, one can see that s∗L(q) is continuous in q around
q = 1, therefore, there is q big enough that supports the existence of full participation
equilibrium.
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